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1. Introduction
This paper deals with a complex set of issues, but seeks to do 
so in a relatively clear and non-technical manner. It 
proceeds therefore by a series of highly condensed 
propositions and arguments, using a Zimbabwean case study for 
illustration. Some of the more technical and theoretic 
underpinnings of the analysis are relegated to footnotes or to 
the citation of relevant sources.
2. Whv Do People Seek to Manage the Environment?
It is useful to ask this question before we address the topic 
of this paper directly. The question is central to the topic 
of this national conference on "Environment and Development," 
and we cannot glibly assume that everyone, everywhere, has the 
same reasons for an interest in the environment. Different 
motives have different effects and policy (and I understand 
that this Conference is part of a policy-making process) has 
to understand who is interested in what concerning the 
environment.
Much has been written of this question from philosophic, 
environmentalist and developmentalist perspectives. But 
perhaps we can simplify the answer here by suggesting that 
people seek to manage the environment for two reasons: a) 
Because its management improves the conditions of their 
livelihood. b) Because its degradation is perceived to be 
threatening, either to life-sustaining processes (eg. 
pollution, soil erosion) or to peoples' aesthetic values. 
These two sets of reasons inter-relate, but the distinction 
between them is important since the first tends to predominate 
in the developmentalist perspective while the second tends to 
be prominent in the conservationist stance.1
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But this is all highly generalized, and to move the analysis 
closer to our topic I make the following proposition in answer 
to our question: People seek to manage the environment when 
the benefits of management are perceived to exceed its costs. 
This is an important proposition since it introduces the issue 
of cost, which is a fundamental dimension of environmental 
management. People may want to, manage the environment for 
better production, or to prevent the effects of its 
deterioration. The benefits they perceive may be short or 
long term. But they will only manage the environment if they 
consider the benefit to be worth the cost and if they have the 
means to meet these costs. The costs of environmental 
management are taken up again later in this paper.2
3. The Environment and Natural Resources
So far we have been discussing "the environment," which in the 
context of this conference I take to mean the habitat or 
ecosystem in which human beings live. But the topic of this 
paper focusses on natural resources, which we can define as 
those components of the ecosystem which sustain life or 
provide goods and services useful to man.3 Some of these 
resources are truly global, the atmosphere being perhaps the 
best example. Others are specific to given microenvironments. 
Some are renewable, others are not. Some are mobile, some are 
static. I make these distinctions because the nature of the 
resource involved is critical in determining the management 
regime most appropriate for it. The global salience of the 
atmosphere is a strong argument for the internationalization 
of its management but it would be folly to suggest that this 
necessarily applies to all natural resources, particularly 
those natural resources on which this paper concentrates, i.e. 
woodlands, grazing resources and wildlife.4
The nature of the resource also has a bearing on whether it is 
considered a 'common pool' resource,5 i.e. one which falls 
within "a class of resources for which exclusion is difficult 
and joint use involves subtractability." (Berkes and Farvar, 
1988: 7) Some resources, such as trees, are fixed to a given 
land base and can be privatized or remain in the commons with 
no intrinsic difficulties. Wild mammals, generally, are more 
mobile (or 'fugitive') and less amenable to privatization, 
although this can be done through adequate fencing.
Fish are even more difficult to confine to defined spatial 
bases in large water bodies and difficult to privatize except 
through aquaculture. However it is not only the nature of the 
resource which determines whether it is common property, but 




Generally, natural resources can-be. held under any one of four 
property-rights regitaes:.. ii^ a) Open-Access; b) Communal 
Property; c) Private^Property-;- d)' State Property. These, 
formally, should determine who the managers are but of course 
what is formal and' what is ^ actual may well be different. 
Furthermore, this is an analytic typology; in practice natural 
resources are rarely managed solely within any one of these 
types.
The "open access" condition is one where resources are the 
property of no one and are available to everyone. It is 
therefore not strictly a property-rights regime at all nor is 
it a management regime since people use, oportunistically, the 
resources but do not manage them. A communal property regime 
is quite different, even though many scholars confuse the two. 
Here "use-rights for the resource are controlled by an 
identifiable group and are not privately owned or managed by 
governments; there exist rules concerning who may use the 
resource, who is excluded from the resource and how the 
resource should be used." (Berkes and Farvar, 1988: 10) Thus 
it is a management regime, with rules on access to or 
exclusion from proprietorship of natural resources.
The relative merits of state or private property regimes have 
occupied centre stage in debates about natural resource 
management and have been embedded in, and mystified by, 
broader ideological and geopolitical controversies. 
Proponents of privatized natural resource management have 
suggested that market dynamics coupled with long-term security 
of tenure provide the best ingredients for sustainable 
utilization and efficient management. Proponents of state 
management usually rest their case on equity considerations or 
collective societal interest in common pool resources. 
Interestingly these two perspectives, so different in their 
ideological pedigree, now find themselves in a new alliance 
orchestrated by state bureaucracies and international agencies 
and realized in "regulatory policies, new legal frameworks, 
project financing, and direct administration." (Korten, 1986)
Both private and state natural resource management regimes 
have their strengths and may be appropriate for given 
resources in given contexts. But both have their weaknesses, 
particularly if they are under-funded, large-scale and 
managerially distanced from the resources in question. In 
such circumstances the state, or the private owner, purports 
to be the manager but de facto use and management are in the 
hands of others - the people living with the resources 
concerned. Not only is this local management resource 
marginalized, it is also antagonized. Bromley and Cernea 
comment, "Unfortunately most state property regimes are
Who Manages Natural Resources? .. .
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examples of the state's 'reach exceeding its grasp.' Many 
states have taken on far more, resource management authority 
than they can be expected,.to carry out effectively. More 
critically, it sets the government: against the peasant when, 
in fact, successful resource -management requires the 
opposite.” (Bromley and ;Cernea,_ 1989: 25) This brings to
mind the Turkish saying, "One would have to be a despicable 
fool not to help oneself to state property." (Berkes and 
Farvar, 1988: 10) But this can apply to the private property 
regimes as well. One variant of this approach is to be found 
in schemes currently being brokered in the United States to 
buy large tracts of South American rain forest to preserve 
them for global environmental reasons. An advertisement to 
raise funds for such purchase recently appeared in a 
California paper replete with a photograph of a burning forest 
and the caption "If you own it they can't burn it."6 Anyone 
with developing country experience will be skeptical. Even if 
this is a ploy to pre-empt other local entrepreneurs from 
buying and destroying forest resources it is unlikely that a 
distanced, foreign owner will be able to exercise the 
management that the state has failed to provide because it has 
marginalized the management potential of local populations.
One of the central tragedies in the history of Southern 
African land and natural resource management is that the 
debate on tenure7 has largely been restricted to a discussion 
of the relative merits of state or private property regimes. 
Policy has assumed two options, privatize or nationalize, 
ignoring the further option of a communal property regime.
In Zimbabwe, for instance, by 1961 approximately 50% of the 
total land surface had been alienated into private hands. The 
rest was state land - parks, wildlife and forestry lands or 
communal lands (37%). In these communal lands, where over 
60% of the population lived, a putative system of 'indirect 
rule' was in place and traditional leadership structures were 
supposed to play a role in land and resource management. But 
the ability of these traditional structures had been seriously^ 
eroded by its tenure status. They and their constituencies-" 
were on state land with usufructural rights only, they had no-' 
powers of exclusion and access to certain natural resources 
(eg. wildlife) were denied to them. Thus the conditions for 
a genuine communal property-rights regime were removed. Under 
these conditions, and with the state effectively unable to 
manage resources, resource use tended to acquire the 
characteristics of an 'open access' system. It is not 
surprising therefore that the communal lands have been the 
scene of the greatest environmental degradation in the 
country.8
This policy myopia, which sees only privatize or nationalize 
tenure options, has continued in the post - 1980 independence
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era. Land reform programmes have taken a further 8% of total 
land surface out of private hands for the resettlement of 
communal land inhabitants, but these resettlement lands are 
state lands, and are occupied under tenure conditions which if 
anything are more restrictive to a genuine communal property- 
rights regime than in communal lands.9
The tragedy of this situation lies in two dimensions. 
Firstly, neither option will viably address those areas where 
most of our rural populations live and which are under the 
greatest environmental pressure. Management by the state has 
demonstrably been ineffective in both the colonial and post 
colonial eras. Whole-scale privatization is politically 
unlikely10 and would involve a fragmentation of management to 
levels where any possible benefits would be negated. 
Secondly, focus on the two options ignores the potential for 
cost-effective collective local management enforced by 
informal peer pressure and drawing on evolved and detailed 
knowledge of local ecological dynamics. Unless policy on 
tenure and natural resource management seriously considers the 
third option of communally-based resource management regimes 
for much of our land there is little reason, either from the 
historical record or from an analysis of the factors and 
dynamics involved, to be optimistic about our environmental 
future.
Serious consideration of this option requires however far more 
i/than decentralized administration or current and trendy plans 
Wto 'involve' local people in planning, to encourage their 
-/participation' in project implementation and to increase the 
economic benefits to them arising from resources. However 
well intentioned, such plans generally fail to achieve the 
perception of cause-and-effect relationships which is the 
essential component in the motivational dynamics of 
sustainable natural resource management and utilization. 
'Participation' and 'involvement' turn out to mean the co­
optation of local . elites and leadership for exogenously- 
derived programmes; 'decentralization' turns out to mean 
simply the addition of another obstructive administrative 
layer to the bureaucratic hierarchy which governs natural 
resource management. What is required is the establishment of 
communal property regimes by defined groups in defined areas 
and with rights of inclusion and exclusion. Such groups 
should have proprietorship of the natural resources concerned, 
'proprietorship' being used here to mean a sanctioned use- 
right, including the right to decide whether to use the 
resources at all, the right to determine the mode and extent 
of their use, and the right to benefit fully from their 
exploitation in the way they choose.11
The delegation of proprietorship over natural resources to 
communities involves the relinquishment of considerable
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authority and responsibility on the part of the state, 
although such relinquishment is never total anymore than the 
privatization of land holdings implies a total withdrawal of 
state authority over land. Relinquishment of authority runs 
however contrary to the 'bureaucratic impulse and the 
establishment of communal natural- resource management regimes 
will require strong policy directives to overcome this 
tendency.12
5. Managing a Natural Resource: From Analysis to Principles
To translate this general discussion of issues into a policy 
which is viable for communal property regimes of natural 
resource management we need to recognize the principles 
involved. These may vary according to the nature of the 
resource concdrhed, and for clarity I will use wildlife as the 
illustration, suggesting some principles in the form of 
propositions.
5.1 Effective management of wildlife is best achieved bv 
giving it focussed value for those who live with it. 
This principle encapsulates the proposition stated in 
Section One that "people seek to manage the environment 
when the benefits of management are perceived to exceed 
its costs" and the discussion on formal and de facto 
management in Section Four.
5.2 Differential inputs must result in differential benefits. 
This principle relates to the question, "value for whom?" 
The answer is "those w h o have the resource and- pay for 
its existence." Wildlife assets are distributed unevenly 
in any national context; equally the cost of sustaining 
and managing these assets is unevenly distributed. These 
costs include crop and livestock damage, the costs of 
preventing them, possible deaths or injury to humans and 
the opportunity costs of assigning land and vegetation to 
wildlife rather than other options. Policy must ensure 
therefore that benefit is directly related to input.13
5.3 There must be a positive correlation between Quality of
management and the magnitude of benefit. The
differential input requiring differential benefit 
involves not only the assets and costs mentioned above, 
it also incorporates management costs, both quantitative 
and qualitative. A fundamental policy objective is to 
provide the motivation for good management, thus policy 
should ensure that good management 'pays*.
5.4 The unit of proprietorship should be the unit of 
produceion, management and benefit. Institutionally this 
is the only structure which can efficiently combine the 
principles mentioned earlier. Proprietorship (which
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answers the question "who .decides?”)14 cannot be 
separated from production,. management and benefit and is 
a fundamental component in a .communal resource regime. 
The management prerogatives and responsibilities implied 
in proprietorship, need not conflict with any larger 
structures of management activity. Such structures are 
necessary because of theJnature of wildlife resources, 
but should be primarily coordinative and regulatory.
5.5 The unit of proprietorship should be as small as 
practicable. within ecological and socio-political 
constraints. From a social dynamics perspective scale is 
an important consideration; large-scale structures tend 
to be ineffective, increasing the potential for 
inefficiency, corruption and the evasion of 
responsibility. Conversely, a communal resource 
management regime is enhanced if it is small enough (in 
membership size) for all members to be in occasional 
face-to-face contact, enforce conformity to rules through 
peer pressure and has a long-standing collective 
identity.15
6. Managing a Natural Resource: Wildlife Policy and Practice in
Zimbabwe's Communal Lands
This section describes an attempt to put the principles 
outlined in Section 5 into policy and practice, using the 
Zimbabwean experience in wildlife utilization as an example.
The growth of the wildlife industry in Zimbabwe had its 
impetus in the 1975 Parks and Wild Life Act which conferred 
proprietorship16 of wildlife resources on the "owners or 
occupiers of alienated land.” These owners or occupiers are 
designated "appropriate authorities" for wildlife on their 
land, with rights to decide on whether to use wildlife, the 
mode of this use and to benefit fully from the revenues of 
this use. The positive impact of the 1975 Act on both the 
state of wildlife populations on commercial farm land and the 
national economy is readily apparent. In the last 15 years 
Zimbabwe has developed a game ranching industry second to none 
in Africa and which contributes significantly to the national 
economy. The conferment of wildlife proprietorship on land 
owners has also demonstrated that wildlife can be a highly 
competitive and environmentally sound form of land use, 
evidenced by the large number of ranchers who have turned from 
exclusive livestock regimes to mixed wildlife/livestock or 
exclusive wildlife modes of utilizing their land.17 It should 
be noted that principles 5.1 - 5.4 discussed in the previous 
section are all incorporated in the position provided for land 
owners under the Act, and that the growth of the wildlife 
industry in Zimbabwe can largely be attributed to the fact 
that policy and legislation incorporates these principles.
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Enacted during the Smith era the 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act 
was targeted at the "owners and occupiers of alienated land." 
It was clearly racially discriminatory since it benefitted 
large-scale land owners and occupiers almost all of them 
white,, and did not provide the same opportunity to the black 
occupiers of communal land. Much of this land, particularly 
that in Natural Regions IV and' V,1 held valuable populations of 
wildlife and high potential for "the incorporation of wildlife 
into productive forms of land use. Government (through the 
Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management) 
5 . remained the appropriate authority for wildlife in communal
lands, policy being that revenues accrued by Government from 
safari hunting in communal lands were to be returned to 
district councils for community projects in producer areas 
through an extended chain of procedures involving notification 
of revenue generated, proposals for projects by district 
councils, approval by regional and DNPWLM authorities and 
release of monies by Central Treasury. The result was an 
almost total failure to achieve community support for 
wildlife-related activities. Procedural complexity and 
bureaucratic inertia resulted in a situation where only a 
portion of revenues generated were returned to producer 
districts and far less of this was returned to producer 
communities. That revenue which did survive the attrition of 
this process was seen by local inhabitants not as a product of 
their management but rather as a hand-out from Government, the 
magnitude of which was attributable not to their husbandry of 
the resource but rather the strength of their complaints about 
the inconveniences of wildlife. The links between production 
and benefit, input and outcomes, was neither direct nor clear.
Recognizing that its policy on wildlife was having positive 
effects on private lands but not in communal lands, Government 
since Independence has approached the problem by further legal 
change and the introduction of the CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas 
Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) Programme.18 
Amendments to the Act made provision for the Minister to 
designate district councils as the appropriate authority for 
wildlife on lands under their responsibility, granting them 
the rights and responsibilities accorded to the owners or 
occupiers of alienated land, under such conditions as might be 
appropriate.% The CAMPFIRE Programme sought to use this 
legislative change to put in place the principles outlined in 
Section Five, the programme starting with pilot schemes in the 
conferment of appropriate authority status on two district 
councils, Guruve and Nyaminyami. Initial success was followed 
by the inclusion of other district councils; by January 1991 
twelve district councils had achieved appropriate authority 
status and more are expected to be added to the list shortly. 
Wildlife revenues accruing to district councils now exceeds 
Z$400 000 per annum in some instances, providing an increase 
in direct revenues for these councils by a factor of four.
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From a district council )aerspf2ct;iye the programme in a great 
success, and the councils., concerned have formed themselves 
into a national association\of Campfire district councils to 
lobby for their interest’s^at^thjs..political centre.
n n c f >/ r iIn spite of the demonstrated rsuccess of CAMPFIRE m  devolving 
proprietorship of wildlife resources from central government 
to district councils a fundamental discrepancy remains between 
the law (the statutory delegation of .proprietorship) and the 
principle (combining production, management, authority and 
benefit). The Act delegates proprietorship and the 
responsibility which goes with it to district councils. But 
they are not the producers or on-the-ground managers of 
wildlife; these are producer communities within council areas, 
which differ from one another in resource endowment, quality 
of management and production. Thus we do not yet have the 
formal combination of production, management, authority and 
benefit necessary for an effective communally-based regime of 
resource management. Under such conditions, councils have a 
tendency to retain authority, management and benefit, 
relegating to producer communities the function of 
production. There are several reasons for this, including the 
bureaucratic impulse to retain authority (cf. footnote 12), 
the necessity for councils to raise revenues and the fact that 
councils do not trust local communities to make the right 
decisions.19
In this situation the CAMPFIRE programme has proceeded on the 
basis that district councils, having been granted appropriate 
authority status, will delegate that authority to producer 
communities, retaining such safeguards as are necessary to 
ensure that their statutory responsibilities are fulfilled. 
This is stipulated in the Guidelines (DNPWLM, 1991) issued by 
the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management to 
district councils.20 To a large extent it can be said that 
successful CAMPFIRE implementation at local levels to date has 
been determined by the extent to which district councils have 
followed this directive; the success stories of CAMPFIRE are 
largely found in those districts where councils have done 
so/ 1
Two of these success stories are now briefly related to 
demonstrate the dynamics of successful implementation of 
CAMPFIRE. They are the stories of how two communities in 
Zimbabwe have developed as "institutions for resource 
management."
The first is the story of the Kanyurira community, a ward in 
the Zambezi Valley falling under the jurisdiction of the 
Guruve District Council. The ward is geographically large 
(400 square kilometres) but small in human population, with 
only 60 households (482 people) being present in 1988.22 The
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area is rich in wildlife and for ijany years has been exploited 
by professional safari fturit6rs/brit before the introduction of 
the CAMPFIRE programme revenues .from this exploitation were 
channeled to Central Treasury/ Ideal people only benefitting 
ytjcav\ wildlife through noft-sanctioned hunting and snaring. 
Attitudes towards wildlife were almost completely negative; it 
was a hazard to life and crops arid should be eliminated. The 
community's aspirations were centred on gaining more goods and 
services from government - a school, a clinic and better roads 
to market their one cash crop, cotton. Its strategy was to 
encourage new settlers, who would be placed on the perimeter 
of settlement (thus taking the brunt of wildlife damage to 
crops) and giving the community greater leverage in its 
requests to government.
In December 1988 the district council, using revenues from 
safari hunting in the previous year, built a school for the 
community. Although this was not a full delegation of 
' proprietorship, being more in the nature of a hand-out, its 
impact on community attitudes was significant. Wildlife was 
now seen as having significant economic value, to be nurtured 
rather than eliminated. "We see now," said one elder, "that 
these buffalo are our cattle." Furthermore the event revived 
a proprietorial attitude towards the ward's natural resources 
which had long laid dormant. A wildlife committee was formed, 
which soon moved into land use planning. Twenty square 
kilometres were set aside for fields and settlement, to be 
surrounded by an electric fence. The rest of the ward was to 
be set aside for wildlife, harvested sustainably through 
safari hunting and patrolled by game scouts from the 
community.
In February 1990 the district council distributed 1989 
revenues from the safari operation which covered the area 
including Kanyurira, using the site of animals taken on quota 
as the basis of distribution. On this basis Kanyurira received 
by far the largest share - Z$47 000. This revenue was
allocated to a fund for the clinic, the purchase of school 
furniture and a dividend to each household of Z$200, 
equivalent to an additional 56% of annual gross income from 
cotton, the community's main cash crop. The impact of the 
household dividend was profound. Internally the community had^ 
to make searching decisions as to who constituted households*?^ 
externally the community examined much more critically any 
applications for membership by aspiring immigrants,/ The 
importance of rules of inclusion and exclusion had become 
clear/ Issues relating to modes of marketing in the modern 
context were also more sharply delineated in community 
thinking. The district council had, as one aspect of its 
utilization strategy, instituted a cropping scheme to provide 
meat to villages in the safari area, believing that the way to 
people's minds was through their stomachs. Kanyurira rejected
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this scheme for its area;, they recognized that the value of an 
impala sold to a safari client was far higher than that sold 
for meat to local ..inhabitants. . The importance of good 
management for maintfaj»iifcj the resource was also heighted in 
local perceptions . /£^ yr Poaching *by community members was 
virtually eliminated.^urin^ 1990. The snaring of an animal 
was no longer tolerated' as individual and entrepreneurial 
defiance of state regulation, it. was now theft from the 
community and from one's neighbours since it would reduce the 
amount of household dividends. The importance of preserving 
habitat became clearer; in 1990 for the first time in many 
years destructive late dry-season bush fires did not occur.
At the same time the community has become increasingly 
aggressive in its claims for full proprietorship. When it had 
developed its land use plan the community had charged its 
councillor and wildlife committee chairman with the task of 
taking the plan to the council for approval with these words: 
"Tell them that these are our animals and these are our pLgqis. 
We will not accept any changes imposed by others .J^ ;tX^he 
community also is demanding a full and detailed accounting 
from the council and^safari operator of species take-offs and 
revenues generatedxH^/ This has been accompanied by a 
realization that the community itself will have to improve its 
own wildlife monitoring and financial record keeping. Thus 
the importance of accountability - of council to community and 
community leadership to community membership - has been 
v * stressed^//
Kanyurira is an example of a community developing its resource 
management along CAMPFIRE lines in an exploratory and 
evolutionary way and in a context where the district council, 
while committed to the CAMPFIRE programme, has been cautious 
and sometimes inconsistent in delegating its authority. Our 
second example is of the Chikwarakwara community in the 
Beitbridge Council area, where the council, on receiving 
appropriate authority status in January 1991, determined to 
immediately and fully implement CAMPFIRE principles. Using 
accumulated safari hunting revenues for the 1990 and previous 
seasons (Z$96 000), council decided on an allocation according 
to production by producer communities which resulted in a 
payment to Chikwarakwara of Z$60 000, where most of the safari 
hunting had occurred.
The introduction of the CAMPFIRE programme in Beitbridge was 
recent and without the evolutionary development which had 
occurred in Guruve. One could say that its introduction was 
'sudden' and the value of this case study primarily lies in 
its demonstration of how in a compressed time-frame of three 
months (January - March 1991), a district council and a 
community can work through and put in place the institutional 
framework necessary to implement the CAMPFIRE principles.23
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At this stage the case ,study is particularly instructive in 
demonstrating the competence of a- district council and local 
community to create an "everyone,benefitsw situation in the 
use of common property assets while retaining the principle of 
differential input/differential benefit. Council benefitted, 
since it retained a 11.7% levy (Z$»ll 235) agreed to by all 
parties. The safari industry benefitted since a programme was 
being put in place which would ensure that the wildlife 
resource on which it depended would be maintained. Government 
benefitted since its acquisition of taxes and hard currency 
from the safari industry would similarly be maintained. The 
Chikwarakwara community benefitted because it was now 
receiving real value for its wildlife resources in proportion 
to the inputs involved and other communities benefitted 
through the stimulus to similarly develop their wildlife
The Chikwarakwara example is however most interesting in its 
illustration of decisions made within the community regarding 
the use of wildlife revenues. As in Kanyurira, these 
revenues forced answers to a prior question - who were the 
members of the community. Criteria for membership (by 
household) having been decided, 149 households were listed and 
the determination made that each household' would be credited 
with $400. The community debated (over several sessions and 
fully documented in Child and Peterson, 1991) then turned to 
the relative merits of using this money for collective 
community projects or for individual household revenue. The 
result was a compromise, as wise decisions often are. 
Households were to receive individual dividends; if wildlife 
was to be a major form of economic activity in the community 
this was necessary for the livelihood of its people. But 
certain collective community concerns also demanded attention. 
These were identified as a grinding mill, a school project, 
and the fact that community members were in arrears in payment 
for the school building funds. The grinding mill, being a new 
community project, demanded a new institution. Who would 
manage it? A committee was formed, it being agreed that the 
mill would be operated as a community business with all 
community members owning shares in it.
These decisions were given immediate, clear and ostensible 
effect at a community meeting held on Thursday 28th March, 
1991. District council officials arrived at the meeting with 
Chiwarakwara1 s $60 000 in cash, which was placed at the end of 
a long table. Further down this table were two dish pans, the 
first presided over by a community leader and the second by 
the school headmaster. Each household head received and 
signed for $400 at the head of the table, then deposited $200 
in the first dish for the grinding mill and school project, 
this deposit being recorded and constituting a share in these 
projects. At the second dish a further $60 was paid to the
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headmaster for arrears in building - fees, and the household 
head then left with $140 still'in pocket.
The impact of these' events* is best summarized in verbatim 
quotes" from speechis1 made ert? the ceremony. From the
district administratht’ we-: |iafe thfese words: "We have not
realized our richne'ssV We'have not seen where our advantages 
lie. We are learning and you here in this community are
leading the way. rt ' is our wild animals who are our
resources. I used to come here and he told wildlife was a 
problem. Poaching was kept under the blanket. Now we are 
here to celebrate wildlife and bring everything into the open 
for everyone's benefit.” Councillor Nhare said the following: 
"This money comes to you from your wildlife. It is your 
money. The decision is yours. You cannot wait for
government. You can develop your own community according to 
how you decide."
These brief descriptions of the Kanyurira and Chikwarakwara 
case studies do not do justice to the full range of issues 
involved. They do not discuss the details of implementation 
or adequately stress the importance of close collaboration 
between government, communities, private sector enterprise and 
N.G.O. actors. Neither have they stressed the variety of 
problems which are generated by change and success. But they 
do illustrate that the principles behind CAMPFIRE are sound 
and that communities, given the opportunity to do so, can 
develop as effective institutions for natural resource 
management.
7. Some Concluding Observations
This paper has argued that resource management is a complex 
affair and that the nature of the resource involved, the 
nature of the tenure system concerned and the motivational 
dynamics which operate create different equasions which must 
be considered when considering institutions of management. 
There is no single formula for all these equasions. However 
we have primarily been concerned with the management of common 
property resources in communal conditions, and in conclusion 
I wish to summarize the discussion on these under three 
headings.
7.1 Communal Contexts and Communal Resource Management 
Regimes. For most of the rural populations of Southern 
Africa the communal context is the context of life and 
will be so in the forseable future. They live on state 
land, not private land, and in conditions where the state 
is incapable of sustainable resource management and local 
inhabitants have neither the motivation nor the authority 
to sustainably manage resources themselves. The mischief 
arises from a fundamental misconception which equates the 
communal context with a communal property regime. The
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communal contexts created fcy colonialism are not communal 
property regimes since they have been stripped of the 
necessary entit\ements regpi^-ed. The evidence is that 
communities can- become 4f£eetive institutions for 
sustainable resource management, but only if they are 
granted genuine proprietorship,, i.e. the right to use 
resources, determine the mode of, usage, benefit fully 
from their use, determine the distribution of such 
benefits and determine rules of access. Any policy which 
excludes these components will frustrate the goal of 
making communities effective institutions for resource 
management.
7.2 Resource Management and Resource Use. Resource use 
without resource management is non-sustainable. But 
equally, any attempt to establish resource management 
without resource use is likely to be futile. A first 
principle stated in this paper was that "people seek to 
manage the environment when the benefits of management 
are perceived to exceed its costs." We can carry this 
further and suggest that in modern rural Africa, even in 
its remotest extensions, benefit is most often seen in 
peoples' thought as revenue, cash income convertible into 
the various goods and services that communities and 
individuals want or need. Benefit is of course not only 
this, but much development thinking seems to assume that 
what rural peoples need and want is restricted to 
subsistence maintenance. Contrast this with the succinct 
definition given by a villager in Kanyurira.
"Development," he said, "means money." This is a more 
accurate description of rural African perceptions of 
development. Not only does it properly reflect the 
pervasive reach of the "cash economy," it also puts 
benefit in the form of revenue which can be flexibly used 
according to peoples' own priorities, and which forces 
them to build their own institutions of fiscal management 
which articulate with the larger economies of which they 
are a part. Cash, as they say, is the most effective 
development extension agent.
There is a strategic implementational lesson to this. If 
we are concerned to promote communally based 
environmental management, chances of success are enhanced 
when a common property resource of high financial value 
is available and project focus is initially on the 
sustainable exploitation of that resource. In Zimbabwe 
this resource has been wildlife, a resource of high and 
escalating value, exploitable in environmentally benign 
ways and requiring relatively low capital inputs. As 
Child puts it, "Real and immediate benefits, graphically 
.^illustrated by cash, cement the relationship between 
wildlife and economic development. These incentives are
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crucial to encourage'^-communities to cultivate their 
wildlife resources-.-(Child and Peterson, 1991, p. 41) 
Initial and dramatic results in revenue generation of 
this kind then’ tia^e art1 incremental effect on the quality 
of the coimunity^s manSgement- of other, less lucrative, 
natural resources^' '“ If people receive revenue from 
wildlife they will also start to manage their woodland 
and their soils, ’as the Kanyurira case study 
demonstrates. Ecological holism is not a new concept for 
rural African peoples, it is simply a concept that their 
circumstances have not allowed them to apply.
7.3 Resource Management and Institution Building. This paper 
has argued that communities under the right circumstances 
can be effective institutions for resource management. 
The obverse is also true. The management of common 
property resources can act as a powerful catalyst for 
/pommunal institutional development in modern rural 
'African conditions. This is particularly the case if the 
resources concerned have high revenue-generating 
potential and are thus central to community development 
aspirations. For too long "community development" has 
been conceptualized in Africa as an extension to local 
levels of central government institutions. The examples 
of Kanyurira and Chikwarakwara given in this paper are 
examples of something different, a demand-driven 
institution building, the demand being local economic 
interest and the necessity of creating institutional 
structures to manage common property and balance 
individual and collective interest. As Peterson states, 
'i "CAMPFIRE is not just a wildlife programme, it is not 
jeven just an economic development programme based on 
wildlife. Ultimately it is a people and institution 
development programme based on the sustainable production 
of wildlife." (Child and Peterson, 1991; 86 - 87)
Thus resource management and local institutional development 
are mutually reinforcive. The topic of this paper is 
centrally relevant to environmental conperns. It is equally 
relevant to governance in rural A f r i c a I f  this is realized, 
the crucial links between ecology and politics, between 
environment and development, stand a better chance of being 
incorporated into policies that work. ^
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FOOTNOTES
1. Holmes .Rolston draws this distinctlorr in indifferent way. He 
notes that it is a universally ac&spted insight that "humans 
must live in response ‘ to- rnature. - in 'encounter with their 
natural environment," but tfrat€ke notion that "humans have a 
responsibility for nature"'- J'fiaS gained more recent 
philosophical attention. (Rolston, 1988: xi) There is a 
correspondence between his distinctions and those made in the 
text, and it is no coincidence that the recent emphasis on 
responsibility for nature (basically a conservationist 
perspective) is primarily located in the industrialized West, 
where the technological response to nature has most 
pervasively been applied.
2. Implicit in this paragraph are certain definitional 
assumptions which could lead this paper into long detours of 
debate. But briefly, 'management' is distinguished from 
'use'. 'Use' in this paper refers to the exploitation of the 
environment and its resources, which can be either 
constructive or destructive, active or passive. 'Management' 
refers to the structuring of this exploitation; it is in 
effect the 'management of use.' 'Management' as used in this 
paper also assumes the presence of two characteristics: a) 
the use of a specific resource in consideration of its impact 
on other resources, i.e. it is holistic, and b) the use of 
resources in consideration of extended time-frames, i.e. it is 
concerned with sustainable exploitation. Thus 'use' in this 
paper, is qualitatively neutral; 'management' is value- 
weighted.
3. Usefulness can be actual, potential or hypothetical, and can 
be passive or active, consumptive or non-consumptive.
4. Clearly these are not the only natural resources with which 
the Conference is concerned. Water and soils are central, but 
this paper restricts its focus for clarity.
5. Current scholarship variously uses the terms "common pool 
resources" and "common property resources" interchangeably. 
I prefer to follow Ostrom (1986) who uses the first for the 
resource itself and reserves the second for the resource as 
defined by the management system.
6. I am grateful to*my colleague in CASS, Louise Fortmann, for 
bringing this illustration to my attention.
7. 'Tenure' as used in this section primarily refers to land 
although more properly it is "a bundle of rights to use the 
land and its products, by a clearly defined individual or 
group of individuals." (Murombedzi, 1990 : 2)
8. Tenure status is of course not the only factor in the 
environmental degradation present in communal lands. The 
inhabitants had not gnly.been^ deprived of the right to manage 
undera commvjpal property-rights" regime, they had also been 
forced out of,.other- laggr eThey ha£ in effect been subject to 
a double expropriation^ TOii^dunded 'by the unequal entitlements 
forced on them by the-discrimi*>atory structures of Zimbabwe's 
political economy of’the time. For further discussion see 
Murphree, 1990.
9. A fuller exploitation is found in Murphree and Cumming, 1991.
10. Current political policy in Kenya favours this option but this 
is unlikely to be the case in other countries of eastern and 
southern Africa, at least for much of the land surface 
involved.
11. 'Proprietorship' is used rather than ownership, since it may 
be legislatively convenient for the state to retain ownership, 
particularly over mobile resources (eg. wild life).
12. At a 1989 conference in Nairobi I put forward this 
generalization in the following words: "There is an in-built 
tendency at any level in bureaucratic hierarchies to seek 
increased authority from levels above and resist its 
devolution to levels below." (Murphree, 1989: 4) Since no 
one could think of any exception other participants have 
subsequently quoted this as "Murphree's Law."
13. Frequently arguments of equity are used to suggest the 
contrary. These arguments, however attractive they may be for 
the political ethos, are disastrous when applied to wildlife 
utilization. An example is Botswana's "open access" policy on 
citizen hunting which has resulted in the decimation of large 
herds of game sustainably utilized by local hunter-gatherers 
for centuries by affluent urban-based elites who have the 
vehicles and firearms to do so. Generally speaking rural 
communities which still possess good wildlife assets are those 
which subsist on lands marginal for cropping and which have 
largely been by-passed in the development process. This also 
is an historical cost to these communities and to argue on the 
grounds of equity that they should now share the benefits of 
the growing ,value of wildlife with their more affluent 
neighbours is highly tenous.
14. The 'right to decide' implied in proprietorship importantly 
includes the determination of the distribution of revenues and 
benefits. There is a widespread tendency for policy to 
attempt to control the mode and distribution of benefits, 
placing an emphasis on community projects of collective
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benefit. This often:, steins frsm a. paternalistic distrust of 
the ability of small-scales comm^ifcies to make vise decisions 
on the matter. Our limited experlfp^e in Zimbabwe with small- 
scale units of proprietorship; indicates the,^pntraryirthey are 
more responsible, more.. insightful -and more-efficient in this 
regard than author itie& .from «mts£derthe ^ community. Whether 
wildlife revenues are used, cpliectively-;-or distributed as 
income to households or individuals is largely dictated by 
demand/resource ratios, i.e. the ratio between the magnitude 
of wildlife revenues and the number of members or shareholders 
in the unit of proprietorship. Again our limited experience 
in Zimbabwe indicates that where such ratios permit the 
distribution to households of significant annual revenues this 
becomes a powerful motivation for wildlife conservation and 
use and is particularly important in local decisions about the 
relative merits of wildlife and livestock. In communal 
contexts both livestock and wildlife depend on a common 
property resource, land and its grazing/browsing/water 
capacity. Livestock is however owned by households or
individuals and is directly available to them for consumption, 
sale, loan or collateral. The same is not true of wildlife 
and unless revenues from wildlife are translated into 
disposable individual or household benefits decisions on 
wildlife/livestock options will be skewed towards livestock 
options even in situations where it is apparent that the 
wildlife option is collectively more productive.
15. Bromlely and Cernea state this argument in a different form: 
"The conversion from open access to common property will be 
facilitated in those instances in which the size of the user 
group is small, the users are reasonably homogeneous in 
important socio-economic characteristics, and the users reside 
in close proximity to the resource. (Bromley and Cernea, 
1989: 24)
16. The Act uses the term "custodianship" in its preamble but the 
rights and responsibilities conferred are those defined under 
proprietorship in this paper. Contrary to what is sometime 
alleged, it does not confer ownership, thus allowing the state 
to impose such restrictions on use as are made necessary by 
the nature of the resource.
17. For the growth of the wildlife industry on private land in 
Zimbabwe see Cumming, 1990.
18. A formal statement of the CAMPFIRE programme is provided in 
Martin, 1986. Other descriptions are found in Murphree, 1990, 
Jansen, 1990 and Zimbabwe Trust, 1990.
19. Each of these reasons demand more discussion than this paper 
can supply. Briefly I comment here that: a) The first 
translates into a district-level variant of Bromley and
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Cernea.'s observation Quoted in Section Four of a 'state's 
reach 'exceeding: its ^rafsgv ' " b) ^ The second has a number of 
dimendidfts. The -maf seek ’ to reduce subsidies to
dist£:£3t c o u n c i l s w i l d l i f e "  revenues, and if this is 
passed' on in the mannl&r ^ desdiribed this becomes an indirect tax 
on producer communitiesi:- JSbthJ the state and district councils 
provide infrastrxicturep-for wildlife exploitation and have a 
right to recover chatges ificurred. Wildlife utilization 
should produce a win-win situation for government, councils 
and producer communities. In my view the best approach is 
direct taxation of revenue at producer community levels, c) 
On the third, lack of confidence or trust, bureaucracies tend 
to place local communities in a "Catch - 22" situation; they 
cannot be trusted because they have no experience but cannot 
gain experience because they are not given responsibility.
20. "Guidelines for Campfire" DNPWLM, 1991.
21. Where they have not done so problems have arisen. CAMPFIRE is 
a young programme which has created a number of experimental 
approaches and is now yielding lessons, both positive and 
negative. The negative lessons are important, and many of 
them relate to conceptions of CAMPFIRE as a district council 
rather than a communally - based natural resource management 
programme. Thomas (1991) provides insightful discussion on 
this.
22. Detailed socio-economic data on this community are provided in 
Cutshall, 1989.
23. The events of these three months are fully documented and 
analysed in Child and Peterson, 1991. This publication is 
seminal for an understanding of the implementation of CAMPFIRE 
and should be read by those with an interest in this topic.
24. Quotes taken from Child and Peterson, 1991, pp. 74, 80.
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